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COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION, 
of 25  May  1994 · 
concerning the taxation of small and.medium-sized enterprises EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
The importance of SMEs in  creating jobs and stimulating growth has  been emphasized 
on  several  occasions  in  declarations  and  resolutions  'by  the ·European Council,  the 
Council  and  Parliament.  The  European Council  m  Edinburgh  on  11  ·  and 
12 December -1992  made  a  special call  for  measures  to  promote  private  investment. 
especially investment by SMEs  . 
. The Commission White Paper on growth, competitiveness and employment stressed the 
responsibility of  governments and the Community in creating an environment which is as 
conducive  as  po,ssible  to  the  competitiveness of enterprises,  and in  particular  SMEs.· 
given  that  their_ dynamism,  productivity,  t1exibility  and  innovation  are  vital  to  the 
··  European economy. 
The  need  to  create  a  more  favourable  environment  for  enterprises  is  central  to  the 
strategic programme for the internal  ~arket1 drawn up,by the Commission.  Support for  .  . 
the development of SMEs is essential if the internal market is to be fully effective.  And 
improving the tax environment for SMEs is a key  aspect of the initiatives proposed for 
that purpose. 
The Commission has looked  int~ the. tax treatment of such enterprises, in  line  ~ith the 
· thinking put foi"Ward  in  the  White Paper,  with a view to  making it  easier for  SMEs to 
meet the new requirements of  competitiveness. 
·-._. 
COM(93) 632 final  of 22 December 1993  - Communication from  the Commission to  the Council: 
·.  \ 
"Making the most Of the internal market":  Stra!egic programme. 
2 A detailed examination of  how enterprises are taxed reveals a disparity in tax treatment 
(lepending on the legal form under which they operate (see findings in Annex).  Because 
.  .  . 
of their .legal form,  sole proprieto-rships and partnerships very often have to  pay  income 
tax on the. whole of their income.  The progressiveness of the tax scale means that the 
.  marginal  rates  of tax,  while  sometimes  lower,  are  generally  higher  than  the  rates  of 
coq)oration tax.  This tends to create distortions of competition between enterprises on 
the  basis  of their  legal  form,  particularly  since  the  self-financing ·capacity  of sole 
proprietorships  and  partnerships  ·is  likely  to  be  squeezed  compared  with  that  of 
incorporated  enterprises  of the  same  size  or  even  larger,  owing  to  their  heavier  tax 
burden.  In certain cases this may affect the very development of the enterprise.  Given 
the high proportion of sole proprietorships and partnerships in the  European· Union (it  i~ 
often  estimated  that  one  out of two  firms  is  not  an  incorporated  enterprise),  this tax 
feature has a quite significant impact. 
· Some Member States have themselves introduced tax arrangements based on the concept 
of tax  neutrality  between  incorporated  and  unincorporated  enterprises.  While  tax 
n~u~rality · is  never  complete,  better  equivalence  is  achieved  and  there  is  minimal 
interference  between  these. arrangements  and  the  general  tax  system.  This  special 
machinery  is  designed. to  ensure more  equal  tax  treatment of firms'  reinvested  profits. 
irresp~ctive  of their  legal  form .  (Denmark  and  Greece),  or  place  a  ceiling  on  the 
·progressive tax on trading income (Germany). 
However,  in  most  Member States,  the  solution  most  frequently  advocated  m  such 
~ircurilstances (even if its implications are complex and affect various fields outside that 
of  taxation, especially the social field) is to turn the sole proprietorship-or the partnership 
into  an  incorporat<?d  enterprise.  .. Tax-relief measures  are  often  available  in  order  to 
.  /, 
.. ·. facilitate such operations. 
· The Corrunission wishes to promote such arrangements throughout the Union by inviting 
.  · the Member States which do not yet have provisions of  this kind to adopt them or to take 
..•  ;  .measur~s with equivalent effect. . 




3 .  . 
The ideas outlined in this paper are based on the available data and the answers supplied 
.  .  . 
by  Member States  to  a  questionnaire  on  how  enterprises  are  taxed  and .  what · tax· 
provisions  are  applied  when  a  sole  proprietorship ·or  partnership  converts  into  an 
incorporated company. 
ConcluSions 
Given that the vast majority of small and medium-sized  enterprise~ are  unincorporated •.  ,  .. 
.  - '  .. 
.  and considering their prime role in keeping economic  _activity dynamic in the Community· 
and  in  creating jobs, the  Commission is encouraging the  Member States to adopt any 
measures designed to correct the  dete~ent effects of current taxation. structures on .  the 
self-financing of sole  proprietorships  and  partnerships:  · Greater  fairness in the  tax 
treatment of the profits retained or reinvested by those enterprises should, by giving them. 
a  chance  to  improve  their  self-financing  capacity  and  strengthen  their cash  position,  A  '  ' 
enable· them  to  deal  better  with  the  difficulties  typically  encountered  by  SMEs, 
particularly at the  bottom of the  economic cycle,  and  to  make  the  best  possible  use, 
thanks  to  increased  capacity  for  investment,  of the  opportunities  avail~ble when  the '.  . . 
economy  recovers.  These  initiatives  would  also  have  th~  advantage  of  giving  . 
entrepreneurs genuine freedom of  choice between the various legal forms under which to. 
carry on their activity by reducing the significance of  the taxation factor  i~ their choi~e. 
The  special  systems  openited  in  Denmark  and .  Greece;  and  the .  German  mechanism~ · 
provide  an  interesting  illustration  of the  possible  options.  Other · measures  havl~g 
equivalent effect are also conceivable  (~.g. a special investment reserve).  h is  for,the~ ,,:' 
Member States  to ·choose  those  procedures  which  best  suit  their  domestic  taxation  ..  _,. 
systems. 
4 
.... , Even  if,  because  of the  impact  in  fields  unrelated  to  taxation,  the  conversion of sole 
proprietorships  or  partnerships  into  incorporated  companies  does  not  necessarily 
constitute the  ideal  response  to  the  situation  described.  it  is  still  a  response,  and  it  is 
desirable for an entrepreneur to  be able to choose, throughout the life of his business, the 
legal form which is best suited to its evolution.  Moreover, this is the preferred approach 
in  a number of Member States.  For, while the majority of them consider that,  legally 
speaking, these operations entail the  cessation of a business activity,  the repercussions 
which this normally has in tax terms are often attenuated. 
An examination of the  situation in  the Community thus. reveals that the tax  provisions 
applied  when  sole  proprietorships  and  partnerships  are  incorporated  make  it  possible 
,  qverall ,to  guarantee a minimum level of.tax neutrality when the legal status is changed. 
Isolated  changes  in  tax  legislation  are  nevertheless  desirable,  particularly  in  order  to  · · 
generalize the  options for  imputation of business losses to  the  owner or partner, when 
they cannot be carried over because of  the change in legal status. · And there is a need for 
a reduction in transfer taxes levied on contributfons of  assets which might be modelled on 
the  deferment  of taxation  of capital  gains  often  granted  for  the  same  assets.  · The 
Commission  invites  the  Member States  to ·improve  the  existing  mechanisms  or  to. 
introduce such mechanisms in order to  ensure that, from  the taxation point of view, the 
incorporation of sole proprietorships and partnerships can be undertaken as flexibly  as 
possible. 
These  two  approaches  should  not  be  regarded  as  mutually  exclusive  and  the 
Member States  are,  in  particular,  invited  to  draw  on  the  original  ideas  developed  in 
certain Community countries, with a view to devising, in  partnership with the interested 
parties,  those  solutions  which  are  best  suited  to  dealing  with  the  problem  of 
self-fi~ancing QY  s~~ll.and Il).edium-s!?ed e~~erprise~·'"  -,;,.  · . 
. . 
5 COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 
of 25  May  1994 
concerning the taxation  0~ small and medium-sized enter-Prises 
THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Commtmity, and inparticular the second  · 
indent ofArticle 155  thereof,  -
Whereas on 28 July  1989 the Council adopted Decision 89/490/EEC on the improvement of the 
business environment and the promotion of the development of enterprises,  and  in  particular-
small  and  me~ium-sized  enterprises,  in .  the  ·community<•>,  as  revised  - by  Council 
DeCision  91/319/EEC<2>; 
Whereas  in  its  resolution  of 17  June· 1992  on  Commu~ity action  to -support ·enterprises,  in 
particular small and medium-sized enterprises, including craft-industry enterprisesC3>, the Council 
confirmed "its undertaking to support the consolidation of the action taken to help  e~terprises; 
Whereas by its Decision 93/379/EEC41; the Council adopted, from  1 July  1993,a programme to 
intensify the priority measures and to ensure the conti!}uity of an enterprise policy; whereas the 
programme  gives  priority  to  improving  the ·legal,  fiscal  and  administrative  environment  of 
enterprises; 
· ·Whereas sole proprietorships and partnerships make up a large proportion of small and medium-
sized  e~terprises, whose  role  in  the  creation  of jobs  has  been  emphasized  on  a ·number of 
occasions in differentCommission communications, and,  more particularly, in the White Paper 
on growth, competitiveness and employment;  whereas it is necessary to promote the investment 
capacity of these enterprises;  ' 
Whereas the method of taxing sole proprietorshipsiand partnerships, ·whidi' are ·generally subject 
to personal  income tax,  a tax which is progressive in nature iri  particular by  comparison with 
- corporation tax, hampers the development of  the self-financing capacity of such enterprises and, 
in  an  economic  environment where access  to external  financing  is  beeoming more  difficult, 
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OJ No_L  16(2.7.1993·, p.  68. Whereas the current structure of rates of personal income tax and rates of corporation tax distorts 
competition  between  enterprises,  depending  on  their  legal  form,  to  the  detriment  of sole 
proprietorships and  partnerships;  whereas it is  desirable to work  for  greater tax  neutrality,  at 
least  as  regards  the  implications  which  systems  of taxation  have  for  profits  reinvested  by 
enterprises and,  hence for  their self-financing capacity; 
Whereas  several  Member States  have  already  taken  measures  to  limit  the  existing  distortion 
between taxation  systems,  according· to whether an  enterprise's profits are charged to personal 
income taX.  or corporation tax,  either by granting sole proprietorships and partnerships the right 
to opt for payment of corporation tax on reinvested profits, or by limiting the progressiveness of 
personal  income  tax  by  comparison  with  the rates  of corporation tax  applied ·to  incorporated 
compantes; 
Whereas the incorporation of sole proprietorships or partnerships is likely to resolve, despite its 
impact  on  areas  unrelated  to  taxation  which  affect  the  entrepreneur  and  the  enterprise,  the 
problem of the level of taxation of the non-distributed profits of these enterprises;  whereas such 
an  operation must" be ·carried out without giving rise to  a_  significant revenue cost, 
HEREBY RECOMMENDS: 
Article 1 
_  Member States are invited to adopt those tax measures necessary to correct the deterrent effects 
of the  progressive income tax  payable by  sole proprietorships and  partnerships in  respect  of 
reinvested profits.  In  particular, they should consider the possibility of: 
(a)  giving these enterprises and partnerships in thi_s  respect the right to opt to pay corporation 
tax and/or 
(b)  restrict the tax charge on reinvested profits to a rate comparable to that of corporation tax. 
Article 2 
Mefl).ber  States are  invited  to  adopt  or extend  those  measures  necessary  to  eliminate  the  tax 
.  obstacle  to  changes  in  the  legal  form  of enterprises,  in  particular  the  incorporation  of sole 
proprietorships or partnerships.  · (2) 
Article 3 
Member States  are  invited  to  communicate,  by  31  July  1995,  the  texts  of the  main  laws; 
regulations and administrative provisions which they adopt in response to this Recommendation 
and inform the Commission ofall subsequent changes made in this field . 
... ;Article 4 
This Recommendation is addressed to the Member States. 
Done at Bru!)sels,  25  May  1994  For th~ Commission 
Ch.  SCRIVENER 
Member of the Commission ANNEX. 
· 1..  Current situa,tion as regards the taxation of SMEs' pro_fits 
In view of the importance of SMEs for the European economy and their special nature as 
an  economic  and  social  organization,  their  current  tax  treatment  in  the  Community 
should be examined to  see' how their profits are taxed and in  particular whether or not 
there  are  derogation  measures  in  this  field  under  ordinary _  law  that  are  designed 
specifically for SMEs. 
-
1.1.  Taxation of  enterprises 
.  .  '  .  . 
How an enterprise is taxed generally. depends on its  legai •  form rather than on  its 
size. 
In the case of sole proprietorships, the enterprise's and the proprietor's income are 
taxed together, being charged to personal income tax. 
Partnerships· are  usually  taxed  applying  the  principl~ of'  tax.  transparency:·  the 
profits are taxable in the harids of the partners in proportion to  their rights, even if 
they did not actually draw on those profits. The conditions governing the taxation 
of partnerships are in effect very similar to· those applying to sole proprietorships. 
However,  in  some  Member States· these  firms  are  either  subject  de facto  to~ 
corporati'On tax if they are engaged in industrial or commercial activities (Belgium, 
Spain),  or they  may  opt  ( Fnince)  for  the tax regime  applicable  to  incorporated 
enterprises. 
9 ·In the  case of incorporated enterprises, corporation tax. is  charged on the profits  · 
earned by  the  enterprise  itself.  In  principle,  the  shareholders and members of 
those enterprises are themselve~ taxable only in respect of the profits distributed to 
them. 
1.2.  Establishing the tax base 
The  in~ustrial or commercial profits of sole proprietorships or partnerships subject 
to  income  tax  are,  in  principle.  determined  in  the  same  way  as  the  profits  of 
incorporated enterprises liable for corporation tax. 
The rules governing exceptions under ordinary law essential!)' consist in  flat-rate 
calculation of the taxable amount or simplification of  the taxation procedures. 
In  practice, these arrangements generally concern only sole proprietorships in  the 
craft  sector  or of very  small  size,  given  the  thresholds  for  such  measures  (in 
France,  for  example, the  flat-rate. arrangements are  available only  to  enterprises 
with  a  turnover of less  than  FF 500 000,  or  FF 150 000  in  the  case  of service 
enterprises) and the fact that they are rarely adjusted.  While they offer the  heads 
of small enterprises the advantage of a genuine simplification of their taxation and 
accounting obligations, these arrangements have the drawback of not encouraging 
them to  introduce the  management tools they might need in order to  expand their 
business.  In  practice, the enterprises covered are oftenthose operating at a local 
level. 
10 Enterprises  subject  to  corporation  tax are  always  excluded  from  the  flat-raie 
arrangements.  However, in  a:  number of Member States such companies may,  in 
particular . under  the  fourth.  accounting  Directive,  benefit · from  simplified 
accounting procedures if they  rank  as  small  enterprises.  They may  for  example 
submit an abridged version of their balance:...sheet and profit-and-loss account and 
supply tax  information in  a more  condensed  form;  thus  reducing  the  n~mber of 
forms to  .. be completed at the end of the financi_al  year~  However, they still have to 
comply  with  the  usual  accounting  principles  and  valu~tion methods  of the  tax 
regime for industrial anq con:tmercial protits:-
,  ' 
In practice, in the majority of  cases, with the exception of the tax  treat~ent applied 
to  proprietors'  reni~neration in  accordance with  the transparency or otherwise of 
the legal fon.n chosen for the enterprise, there are no fundamental differences in the 
procedures for determining the, basis, of assessment for enterprises, large or small, 
incorporated or unincorporated.  There are, however, major differences in the rates 
applied:  the  progressive  scale  of personal  income  tax,  the  standard  rate . of 
corporation tax, reduced rates, etc. 
1.3.  Tax rates 
A look at the  tax  rates (see Note I,  page 23) shows that.  in most Member States, 
the  marginal  rates  of personal  income  tax  are  higher  than  the  standard  rate  of 
corporation  tax,  despite  the , general· trend  towards  reducing  rates  for.  both 
enterprises and natural persons.  Because of  their legal form and the absence of any·. 
distinction  between  distributed  and  reinvested  income, sole proprietorships  and . 
partnerships  are  de facto  taxed  on  the  whole  of  tl)eir  income  at  marginal . 
income-tax rates which may be higher than the corporation-tax rates. 
11 This results in a distortion of <.:ompetition  between enterprises on account of their 
legal  form,  to  the  detriment  of sole  proprietorships  and  partnerships.- That 
distortion is all the greater the wider the difference between the rates of income tax 
and corporation tax. 
The system of taxation applying to sole proprietorships and partnerships acts as a 
brake ori  their  investment-based development.  Their self-financing capacity  is 
reduced owing to the higher rates of tax applied to the top slices of income. which 
are those which provide the greatest scope for saving and investing. 
Yet increasing the self-financing capacity of SMEs is the most viable alternative to 
their recourse to  external  sources of finance,  access to  which can  be  particularly 
difficult  in  the  present  economic  situation,  since  financial  intermediaries 
sometimes tend - to !lowing the euphoria of the  1980s -to be excessively cautious 
and reluctant to grant additional funding.  It is therefore importantthat enterprises 
should be  able to  generate sufficient own funds in order to weather any transitory 
difficulties  resulting  from  external  conjonctural  or  internal  factors.  When  an 
enterprise is  In a phase of major expansion, the shift in balance which may occur in  . 
such circumstances makes it more vulnerable, particularly financially. 
Given  that  sole  proprietorships  represent,  on  average,  almost  half of all  the 
·.enterprises  operating  in  the  Member States  of  t~e  Community,  and  that  they 
employ 10-20% of the labour force, the potential impact of this special tax feature 
is quite appreciable. 
Since the various legal forms are unevenly represented in the Community, this tax 
aspect may intluence the optimum level of investment within the single market. 
12 The  distribution  pattern  of  incorporated  enterprises,  partnerships  and  sole 
proprietorships varies considerably  between the  Member States.  ·The  number of 
incorporated enterprises is  very  low in  such countries· as Germany and Italy. and 
particularly high in France, Belgium.and the-United Kingdom (see table in Note 3. 
page 36, on the size of the enterprise sector in the  Member States).  It  is  usuallv  .  . 
smail enterprises which adopt unincorporated  legal  forms,  although the  situation 
varies  according  to· the  Member State:  In  Germany,  for  example,  some  large 
enterprises are run  in  the  form  of partnerships;  in  Belgium, small enterprises· do 
not hesitate  to  incorporate, while only a limited numl?er of large enterprises  use 
incorporation in Germany. 
II.  Ad hoc solutions in some oftheMember States 
In  Denmark,  the sole proprietor may,  each  year,  elect to ·be  taxed  at the  rate  of 
corporation tax on  income retained within .the  firm.  Under this  special scheme, 
.  ,  .  ' 
which  ~)as been  in  force  since  1987  (specjal-business  arrangement or "business 
rules"); a distinction is made, with regard to the nature of  the income withdrawn by 
the entrepreneur, between income from capital and personal in<;ome.  Income from 
capital, which is determined .by applying the average rate of return on bonds for the_ 
ye~.  to  the  enterprise's  net assets,  qualifies  for  the  preferential tax  treatment of 
_dividends (traditionally- applied to  income from shares).- Personal income,  i.~. the 
income withdraWn by the entrepreneur in addition to the return on capital, is taxed 
applying the sliding scale of income tax.  This method, which  is  used  by  about 
.  .  - . 
130 000 firms, makes  i~ possible to achieve equality of tax treatment between sole 
proprietorships,  partnerships  and  incortJ~rated  enterprises  as  regards  income 
retained within the enterprise, Since  the  latter is taxed at 34%-the. same  rate  as 
corporation tax.  The scheme is described in more detail in Note 4, page 37. 
13 Norway and Sweden, too, have schemes which are relatively similar in conception 
to the Danish one.  The downside of this tax arrangement is that it imposes more 
administrative constraints (principally of  an accounting nature) on those enterprises 
which opt for it. 
In  Greece,  the  tax  reform  of June 1992  introduced  a  related  mechanism  for 
enterprises  formed  as  partnerships,  limited  partnerships  or  private  limited 
companies;  previously, these had been subject to  the progressive scale of income 
tax, ranging from 5% to 40%.  Following the reform, their profits will be taxed at 
the· single  rate  of 35%  (as. in  the  case  of public  limited  companies)  less  the 
remuneration of partners or managers (natural persons holding at least one third of 
the  partnership's/company's  shares). .  Such  remuneration,  whether  in  etiect 
withdrawn or not,  is estimated at a flat rate of 50% of the partnership's/company's 
net income, with the partner or manager liable for personal income tax on it.  The 
advantage  of the .reform  is  that  it  provides  for  neutral  treatment of the  profits 
ploughed back by enterprises in the above categories. 
In  Germany,  a  provision  has  been  introduced  with  effect  from  l January 1994 
whereby  progressivencesof income tax on the  profits of sole  proprietorships and 
partnerships is  limited, the maximum at marginal rate of  tax for this type of income 
being capped at 47%.  By contrast, the highest rate (53%) will continue to apply, 
where appropriate,  to  all  the  other taxable  income of taxpayers.  The difference 
between the rate of corporation tax (  45% on undistributed profits2) and that of the 
tax on the  income of non-incorporated enterprises (47%) will  henceforth be only 
two percentage points;  it  would have been more than four times greater had it not 
been capped .. While  the  measure  is of a  different  order to  those  introduced  by 
Greece  and  Denmark,  in  that  it  covers  all  the  income,  whether  distributed  or 
undistributed, of the enterprises concerned, it still shows a similar willingness to 
limit  the  differences  of tax  treatment  between  the  ploughed-back  profits  of 
incorporated enterprises and those of  sole partnerships and partnerships. 
2  The rate is 30% for distributed profits. 
14 (3) 
Diese  Beispiele  i~Iustrieren,  welche  Losungen  moglich  sind,  ohne  mit  dem 
allgemeinen  Steuersy~tem in KonJlikt .zu geraten (Danemark, Griec.henland) oder 
)  - ,  ' 
das  traditionell  ftir  Einzeluntemehrnen· .und  Personengesellschaften  geltende 
Durchgriffsprinzip aufiugeben (Deutschland). 
WelcheLehren kann die Gemeinschaft aus diesen Ma8nahmen ziehen? 
Hier. ·  geht es  nicht  darum,  eine  einzige  dieser  Losungen  als  Modell  filr  die 
Gemeinschaft zu wahlen- sie aile haben ihre Vor- und Nachteile. 
So stchLdcr Dillcrenzicrtheit  und  Angcmcsscnheit des  danischcn  Systems  mit 
dem angestrebten Ziel  steuerlicher Neutralitat die  komplexe  Verwaltung  dieses 
. Systems. gegeniiber.  Das  danische  Steuergesetz  raumt  dem  Untemehmer 
(Einzeluntemehmen und Personengesellschaften) die Mpglichkeit ein, jedes Jahr 
zwischen  der  Sonderregelung  und  der  normalen  Einkommensteuerregelung  zu 
wahl~n, so  daB  er den Umfang der  Selbstfin~ierung des  Untemehrnens durch 
die  Wahl  der je  nach  Untemehrnensergebnis  steuerlich  giinstigsten  Regelung 
optimieren  kann  .. Die  Sonderregelung  setzt  jedoch  voraus,  daB · sich  der 
U~temehffier zu einer detailli(!rteh Buch:fiihfung zwingt. Zwang ist hier  j~doch eiri 
relativer Begriff,  cla  die"buchhalterischen Anforderungen  positive  padagogische 
Auswirkungen haben konnen, indem sie den Untemehmer dazu veranlassen,"sich 
die  fiir  eine  gute  Leitung  seines  Untemehmens  erforderlichen . 
Informationshilfsmittel  zu  verschaffen.  Aul3erdem  sind  mit  dieser  maximalen · 
steuerlichen  Flexibilitat weitere  negative  Konsequenzen  in  Form  erheblicher 
Belastungen  :fiir  den  staatlichen  Haushalt  verbunden.  Diese  Belastungen  liel3en 
sich- mit  Regelungen,  durch  die  die  einmal  getroffene  Wahl  fur  einen 
Mindestzeitraum (von f\inf Jaruen oder mehr) oder unwiderruflich festgeschrieben 
. ware,  zweifellos  begrenzen.  Doch  waren  derartige  Regelungen  mit  hoheren 
Verwaltungskosten :fiir  die SteuerbehOrden verbunden, da sie -strenge Kcmtrollen 
durchfuhren  miil3ten,  urn  eine  ini13brauchliche  Inanspruchnahrne  derartiger 
Sonderregelungen zu verhindem. 
15 .... : Der  ~  orteil des  ~rjechischen Systems besteht darin.  daB  einbeha_ltene  Gcwinnc 
von  Personengescllsch~ttcn  (Einzcluntemehmcn  sind  von  <.Iieser  Rcgdung 
ausgeschlossl!n) und Kapita.lgcscllschaflen stcucrlich glcich behandelt wenlen- in 
beiden Fallen wird ein Korperschaftsteuersatz von 35% erhoben. Diese generell 
..  : 
· angewandte Regelung weist jedoch den Nachteil auf, daB den Unternehmen keine 
Wahlfreiheit  bleibt:  Die  neue  Steuerregelung kann  negative  Konsequenzen  fiir 
diejenigen  kleineren  Unternehmen  haben,  die  bisher  mit· einem  niedrigeren 
·  Grenzsteuersatz der Einkommensteuer unterlageri. 
- Der  besondere  Vorteil  des  deutscben  Mecbanismus  der  Begrenzung  der 
Progression der  Einkommensteuer auf gewerbliche  Einkunfte_ bestebt  in  seiner 
· . einfachen Umsetzung. ·ooch bater den Nachteil, das Steuersystem zu verzerren. 
indem  er  den  sclbstandigen  Untcrnchmcr.  dessen  Steucrsatz  47%  nicht 
ilberschreiten  kann,  vorteilhafter  behandelt  als·  den  abhangig  Beschaftigten, · 
d~ssen Steuerlast 53% betragen kann,  selbst wenn letzterer - beispielsweise als 
Geschaftsfiihrer ~ eine ebtmso grof3e Verantwortung tragt. 
Diese Unterschiede resultieren in erster Linie aus sowohl steuertechniscb als auch 
politisch  bedingten  Entscheidungen,  die  spezifischen nationalen  Gegebenheiten 
Rechnung tragen. 
Dennoch haben aile diese Losungen - so unterschiedlich sie auch sein mogen -die 
positive  Wirkung,  dazu  beizutragen,  den  filr  die  Besteuerung  einbehaltener 
Gewinne  von  Einzelgesellschaften  und  .Personengesellschaften  geltenden  Satz 
dem Korperschaftsteuerreg~lsatz fiir die Besteuerung einbehaltener Gewinne von 
Kapitalgesellschaften anzugleichen  . 
15 Es  sind  weitere . Varianten  mit  , ahnlicher  Wirkung  denkbar.  So  kfinnte 
. beispielsweise eine steuerlich gilristigere Behandlung :der Investitionstiitigkeit_ des · 
Eihzefuntemehrnens  oder  der  Personengesellschaft  darin  bestehen,  zwischen 
einbehaltenen  und  vom  Unteinehmer. oder  den  Anteilseignem  entnommerien . 
Gewinnen  zu  unterscheiden.  Die  einbehaltenen  Gewirine  wilrden  - so fern. der · 
.  .  ~  . 
Untemehmer  (oder  die  Anteilseigrier  · einstimmig)  widerruflich  o<:ler  ·· · · 
unwiderruflich ftir diese Regelung optiert - mit dem Korperschaftsteuersati bele~t  ·. 
und  nur  die  entn'orrurierien  Gewi~e als  gewerbliche  Einkilnfte  mit  der 
Einkommensteuer des Untemehrners (  oder der Anteiiseigrier). 
'  .  '·.  '  ..  ·- .  .  -.  .  .  \ 
Zwar tnachen- die  skandinavischen MaBnahrnen  und  insbesondere das  danische 
Beispiel  deutlich,  daB  derartige. Regelu~gen d~rchfiihrbar sind,  doch  sei ·  auch · . 
.  •  I  :'. 
darauf hingewiesen,  daB  in  einlgeil  Mitgliedstaateri diesbezilglich  eine  gewisse 
· Skepsis herrscht. So  wi~d in Deutschland aufgl1111d der einschUigigeri  ErfahriJ~ge~ 
zu  Be ginn  der:  50er  Jahre  und  im  Vereirugten  Konigreich  aufgrurid  vOn 
.  Unters~chtin~en der s'teuerverwaltung daran gezweifelt, daB ein  System,"b~i d~m .. 
.  ..'  ~  . 
die  einbehalteneri. ·  Gewinne von Einzeluntemehrnen und  Persone~gesellschaft~ri  .· 
wahlweise der Korperschaftsteuer  unterw~rfen werden, angesichts vor alleDl  d~r 
Schwlerigkeit, die Einkommensstrome zwischen Unteme.hrner und  Untemehnie~ 
7iU kontrollieren, und der Gefahr einer miBbrauchlichen Anwendurig der Regelung . 
ilberhaupt praktikabel ware.·. 
In  . diesem  Zusarnrnenhang.  ·Wurde  · als  Alternative  . _vorgeschlagen, ..  den 
Untemehrnen die Bildung spezifischer Investitionsrilcklagen zu gestatten, durch 
die  die  Selbstfinanzierungsmoglichkeiten  der  Untemehrnen ·  erweitert  und  . 
gleichzeitig sichergestellt wilrde, daB die:Mittel fiir I~vestitionen  (materiell~r· oder 
immateric::ller  Art)  verwendet  werden.· ·A~ch hier  ware  es  den  Mitgliedstaateri 
tiberlasse~,. wieviel  Freih~it  sie  de~ Unte~ehrnen bei  der  Ver.wendung  und 
Zweckbestimmung· ihrer Selbstfina.nZierung  lassen (beispielsweise Verbesserung 
der Liquiditiit oder  Ausrilstungsinvestitionen). 
17 Im  Mittelpunkt  der  bisher  dargelegten  · Losungen  steht  das  Bestreben,  die 
Gewinnthesaurierung. von  Untemehmen  aller  Rechtsformen  steuerlich  neutral  zu 
gestalten.  Der  Vorteil  dieser  Mechanismen  besteht  darin,  Uber  die  Besteuerung  das 
Entwicklungspotential der Untemehmen zu fordem, ohne die bestehende Rechtsfomi in 
Frage zu stellen, flir die sich der Unternehmer ursprlinglich aufgrund von steuerlichen3 
oder  anderen  Kriterien  entschieden  hat.  Zur  Zeit  verftigt  nur  eine  Minderheit  der 
Mitgliedstaaten Uber derartige Yorschriften. 
Die  meisten  Mitgliedstaaten  geben  einem  anderen  Konzept  den  Vorzug,. das  darin 
besteht,  die  Anderung der Rechtsform eines bestehenden  Untemehmens steuerlich  zu 
erleichtern. 
III.  STEUERVERGUNSTIGUNG BEl DER ANDERUNG DER RECHTSFORM DER 
KM.l[ 
3 
Zwischen  diesem_  und  dem  vorstehend  erwahnten  Konzept  bestehen  erhebliche 
Unterschiede.  Im  Ubrigen  handelt  es  sich  bei  beiden  weder  urn  exklusive  noch  urn 
miteinander ~nvereinbare Konzepte:  Danemark, Deutschland und Griechenland, die die 
bereits vorgestellten  Ad-hoc-Steuervorschriften zugunsten von  Untemehmen, die nicht 
·in  Form  der  Kapita'lgesellschaft · geftihrt  werden,  eingeflihrt  haben,  sehen  in  ihren 
Rechtsvorschriften  auch  verschiedene  Regelungen  vor,  urn  die  steuerlichen  Nachteile 
bei der Umwandlung eines Einzeh:mternehmens oder einer Personengesellschaft in  eine 
Kapitalgesellschaft zu begrenzen. 
Die heiden  Konzepte stellen jedoch auch keine gleichwertigen Alternativen dar, da sie 
mit  unterschiedlichen  Auswirkungen  auf die  Rechte  und  Ptlichten  der  Untemehmer 
verbunden  sind.  In  die  Entscheidung  des  Untemehmers,  flir  die  Austibung  seiner 
Berufstatigkeit  eine  Kapitalgesellschaft  zu  grtinden  oder- nicht,  spielen  zahlreiche 
steuerfremde Faktoren hinein. Der Umfang der personlichen Haftung des Untemehmers 
wird  oftmals  ein  wichtiges  Entscheidungskriterium  sein.  Als  weiter~s  wichtiges 
Entscheidungselement  sei.  der  Umfang  des  .sozialen  Schutzes  (und  seine  Kosten) 
genannt,  der dem  Untemehmer je nach  gewahlter  Rechtsform  zusteht.  Wenn  a·ndere 
Personen  an  dem  Vorhaben  beteiligt  sind,  werden  auch  personate  Aspekte  in  die 
Entscheidung einbezogen werden. 
In diesem Zusammenhang wird der Unternehmer seine allgemeine steuerliche Situation bewerten; 
in  seine  Entscheidung  tor  oder  gegem  die  Grundung  einer  Kapitalgesellschaft  werden  sein 
derzeitiges  oder  erwartetes  Gesamteinkommen  hineinspielen.  In· allen  Fallen  wird  der 
Unternehmer seine  Entscheidung  in Abhangigkeit  seiner  personlichen  Parameter treffen,  ohne 
sich  notwendigerweise ·darOber  im  klaren  zu  sein,  wie  sich  seine  Entscheidung  auf die_  Kosten 
spaterer lnvestitionen und das Wachstumspotential des Unternehmens auswirkt. 
'  ' 
1S (4) 
It  should  also  be  stressed  that  incorporation  has  a  disadvantage  for. small 
enterprises  in that  it  imposes on  the  head ~of the  enterprise a more  burdensome 
administrative  structure  than  necessary- particularly  if  the  only  purpose  of 
inco!"Poration  i~  to  improve  the  firm's  tax  position- weakening  the.  direct  link 
which exists between entrepreneur and enterprise. 
Nevertheless,. a solution to the problem of the  unequal tax treatment of the profits  · 
of enterprises which are not incorporated and the profits of those which are might 
be  to  encourage the -former  to  incorp'orate.  While  this  might  seem  radical  and 
possibly  disproportionate,  it  would  achieve  the  objective  of  improving  the 
competitiveness  of the  enterprises  concerned.  If a  change· in  legal  form· is 
facilitated or even encouraged so that a corporate form more adapted in tax terms 
to  the  enterprise's  development  is  used,  the  tax  constraints  which  may  be 
encountered by an enterprise operated as a sole proprietorship or a partnership as a 
result of  the entrepreneur's initi~ll choice may then fall away. 
For this reason, it  is important tha.t the tax system should generally after sufficient 
tlexibility as regards the choice of legal  form  in  which the entrepreneur intends to 
carry  on  his  trade.  While  the  entrepreneur  chooses  whether  or  not  to  go  for  · 
incorporation when  he  starts  up  his· business.  a  few  years  later he  may  want  to 
review his original choice as his business grows. 
B~t it  is  also true that the tax disadvantage from.  which the  sole proprietorship or 
the  partnership  may  suffer,  as  it  grows,  vis~a-vis  an  incorporated  enterprise 
materializes when the  level of profits generated by  the enterprise place it  towards 
the upper end of the scale of personal income tax.  Such a situation occurs more 
often at the end of  a strong period ·of growth than when the enterprise is first set up, 
the early years of  a~tivity being characterized generally by a low, or even negative. 
rate of return. 
'' 
19 While  the  need  for  the  enterprise  to  be  able  to  adapt  its  legal  form  to  the 
requirements of competitive markets,  and  the  benefits of the  transformation, are 
clear, it  is  important to ensure that such a change does not entail  tax costs which 
could discourage an enterprise from making it. 
In  the  majority  of Member States,  however,  a  change  of legal  form  geri.erally · 
means the cessation of the business, with the  tax consequences which that entails. 
and  setting  up  a  new  legal  person.  Immediate  taxation  of the  protits of the. 
financial year, of hidden capital gains and provisions initially set aside free of tax. 
loss  of the  opportunity  to  carry  over  losses  from  previous  financial  years  and 
liability for capital duty are the tax  burdens which any enterprise taking this road 
will normally have to face .. 
It  is  riot  often  that  an  enterprise  is  allowed  to  continue,  smce  legal  formalism 
usually  prevails  over the  enterprise's economic  situation;  most  Member States, 
however,  make  a  distinction  according  to  the  type  oJ  legal  transformation 
concerned and its precise technicalities.  Depending on whether the .change is from 
sole  proprietorship  to  incorporated  enterprise,  from  partnership  to  incorporated 
enterprise, or from one form of incorporated enterprise to another, the continuity of 
the enterprise is accepted by certain Member States.  Tax reliefs are also granted if 
certain conditions associated with the legal transformation are met. 
In the case of  the incorporation of sole proprietorships, the notion that the business 
· should automatically  be  wound  up  - which  is  what  most Member States  would 
argue  - may  be  favourably  modified  depending  on the  circumstances:  thus,  in 
Belgium, "continuity" of the enterprise is  accepted for tax purposes if this is  what 
the entrepreneur wants. 
Taking the  transformation of a  partnership  into  an  incorporated enterprise,  some 
Member  States  (Italy,  Portugal}  accept  continuity,  but  most  consider  that  this 
involves cessation of  the enterprise and ·creation of  a new legal person. 
')(\  ..... 
1.:»-However, whatever their attitude  in  terms of legal  t~rmalism  ·(the enterprise may 
continue or should  be  wound  up),  most of the  Member St~tes _have  introduced 
provisions  which  make  it  possible  to  attenuate  the  tax  consequences  of 
transformation.  These measures, the details of which are given in Note 2,  page 32, 
. Member State. by Member State, basically concern the  opp~rttinity to defertaxation 
of the hidden capital gains recorded  a~ the time of  transformation and to carry over 
the  provisions  relating  to  the activity  without  changing  their  purpose,  Certain 
.  '  - . 
relaxationsofregistration duty are also provided for. 
It  is  also interesting to  note that the  p9ssibility which has  been created in  France 
for  partnerships to ,opt (irrevocably) for corporation tax has virtually the same tax 
effects  as  transto~mation  into  an  incorporated  enterprise.  While  the · relief 
.  . 
procedures are the same, there is the additional advantage that hidden capital gains  · 
and profits on which tax has been deferred are not taxed, since no  change is made 
to the accounts and it is still possible to tax capital gains at a later stage. 
Possible lessons from these measures for. the Community 
Legal  formalism  continues to  be  the .  dominant  factor  in  the  Member States' 
assessment of whether an enterprise should continue in business when it wishes to 
change its forin of organization;  howev~r, the tax effects of formalism, .which in 
virtually all cases leads to  the winding::_up 'of the enterprise and the creatiOQ. of a 
.·new entity,  are  atten_uated  by  practical  measures  designed  to  reduce  or defer a 
number of  taxes. 
21 Virtually ali of  the Member States thus have provisions which allow the taxation of 
capital gains  to  be  deferred until  they  are  realized (usually on condition that  the 
entrepreneur undertakes to  hold  on  to  the securities received  in  exchange for  the 
capital contributed to  the  new entity and that the assets transferred continue to be 
' 
carried  at  their  accounting  value  ·in  the  new  entity's  books)  or  allow  the 
entrepreneur to choose between immediate taxation (which enables the new firm to 
calculate the depreciation of  the transferred assets applying the value at which they 
~ere contributed and not the value at which they were carried in  the books of the 
original enterprise) and deferred taxation.  Only one country (Portugal) does not 
permit such choice when sole proprietorships are incorporated. 
Similarly,  all  of  the  Member States  except  Portugal  allow  provisions  to  be  · 
maintained if their object remains unchanged.  Virtually all of them also maintain 
the enterprise's normal deadlines for payments. 
By contrast, legal formalism and its reflection in taxation do not allow losses to be 
carried  over following  a change  in  an  enterprise's  legal  form.  Some countries 
(Germany, France, Luxemb')urg,  United Kingdom) have indicated, however,  that. 
in  such  cases,  losses  incurred  by  a  sole  proprietorship  or  partnership  can be 
imputed to the entrepreneur or the partners. 
As  regards capital duties, some Member States still apply relatively  high rates  to 
real  property  contributed  to  companies  (Belgium,  Greece,  Spain,  France,  Italy). 
However,  some of these  countries  have  introduced provisions to  reduce  this tax 
charge (Belgium, France, Spain) as  long as  securities are issued in  return for  the 
contributions made. ·General introduction of such mechanisms in the Union would 
appear desirable. 
22 ANHANG l 
/. 
Gegeniiberstelh~ng der Korperschaftsteuer- und Einkommensteuersatze ... 
Auswirkung auf die Untemehmensbesteuerung 
Bd einer Gegeniiberstellung der Korperschaftsteuer- und  Einkommehsteuersatze  iri  der 
Geme1nschaft ergeben sichje nach Mitgliedstaat drei  Situatiorien .(siehe--Tabelle);· dies 
wird in den nachstehenden Schaubildem veranschaulicht. . 
ln  der  ersten  Landergruppe ·liegt  der  Korperschaftsteuersatz  nicht · mit  uriter  dem 
' 
marginalen  Einkommensteuerspitzensatz, .  sondem  auch  unter · · dem·  · riiedrigsten 
Einkommensteuersatz. Bei der zw~iten Gruppe ljegt der Korperschaftsteuersatz zwischen 
den  positiven Eckwerten der-Einkommensteuer._. In  der letzten Gruppe _  finden  sich die 
Lander,  in  · ·denen  der  Korperschaftsteuersatz·  gleich  dem-.  maiginalen 
. Einkommensteuerspitzensatz ist oder tiber diesem liegt. 
Danemark und Irland - I~land wegen des- ermaBigten Kol-perschaftsteuersatzes  fi.ir . 
das verarbeitende Gewerbe - gehoren zur ersten Gruppe.  Schon der Vergleich der 
Struktur  der  -Steuersatze  zeigt  eindeutig  die  Begiinstigung ·  der 
korperschaftsteuerpflichtigen Untemehmen gegeniiber den .Ei~eluntemehmen und 
einkommensteuerpflichtigen_ .Personengesellschaften  hinsichtlich  der  steuerlichen 
V  eranlagung ihrer ·  Gewi~e:  Bei_  sonst gleichbleibenaen V  qraussetzungen ist eine 
derartige fiskitlische Behandlung ein nicht zu leugnender Anreiz fiir die Griindung 
eines Untemehmens mit eigener Rechtspersonlichkeit (sofem die administrativen · 
·Kosten nicht prohibitiv sind). 
23 Diese  Anreizwirkuilg  ist  bei  der  zweiten  Uindergruppe  dagegen  schwacher;  i:u 
dieser Gruppe gehOren die meisten Mitgliedstaaten (Belgien, Spanien, Frankreich, 
Griechenland,  Irland (auBer  verarbeitendes  Gewerbe),  Luxemburg,  Niederlande, 
Vereinigtes Konigreich).  Die Rechtsform der Einzelfirma ist von Vorteil,· solange 
der steuerpflichtige  Gewinn  relativ· niedrig  liegt  (ohne  etwaige  Einkommen  aus 
anderen  Quellen);  je  hoher  er  jedoch  ausfallt,  desto  sHirker  benachteiligt  der 
Schwellen- und  Schereneffekt  - weil  die · Einkommensteuer,  anders  als  die  · 
Korperschaftsteuer,  progressiv ist  - Einzeluntemehmen gegeniiber beispielsweise 
Kapitalgesellschaften.  .Dies  gilt  auch  fur  die  ei~ommensteuerptlichtigen 
- . 
Personengesellschaften. 
Allerdings  ist  festzustellen,  daB  zu  dieser  zweiten  Gruppe  drei  Mitgliedstaaten 
gehoren (Belgien, Luxemburg und Vereinigtes Konigreich), die einen progressiven 
Korperschaftsteuertarif an wenden. 
(a)  AuBer  in  Belgien,  das  praktisch  die  Voraussetzungen  definiert  und  diese 
Vort~ile. den  KMU  vorbehalt,  sind  die  ermaBigten  Steuersatze. Teil  der 
normalen  Struktur  de·r  Koq)erschaftsteuersatze  und  gel ten  eher . fur  ·die 
niedrigen Gewinne der groBen oder kleinen Gesellschaften als fur die kleinen 
Gesellschaften  im  eigentlichen  Sinne,  selbst  wenn  diese  letzten · Endes 
statistisch  am  meisten  betroffen  sind.  Durch  diese  MaBnahmen  . kann 
'  -
jedenfalls. der Steuerdruck auf die  klein~n Gesellschaften abgeschwacht und 
ihnen.ihr Start somit erleichtert werden. 
24 (b) _  -Die  Korperschaftsteuerprogression  lafit  sich .: in  diesen  drei .  Sonderfallen 
nattirlich mit dem  progressiven Tarif der  Einkommen~tew!r vergleichen, der 
Einzeluntemehmer in allen Mitgliedstaaten 'unterl iegeri. Z  war· entsprecheri 'die 
ermafiigten- Korperschaftsteuersatze  in.·  Belgien - und  . im  Vereinigten 
. Konigreich  meh,  oder  weniger  den· Steuersatzen  der  niedrigsten  Klassen-
(28 %/26,75 % .b:z\.v. 25 %/25 cyo), doch ist die Progression der entsprechenden 
· Einkommensgruppen  _vollkommen  anders  geartet.  In  den  drei  genannten 
Mitgliedstaaten ist die niedrige Korperschaftsteuerklasse mit eimafiigtem Satz 
.  . 
hoher  oder · gleich  der  zum  m_arginalen  Spitzensatz  besteuerten  hochsten~ 
Einkommenstetierklasse.  Praktisch  bleibt  die  Besteuerung  der  kleinen 
. Handelsgesellschaften vorteilhafter als die der Einzelfirmen. 
(c)  Zu  dieser  zweiten  Gruppe  gehoren  auch - die  Niederlande,  die  eu:ten 
degressiven .Korperschaftsteuertarif anwerid~n, und zwar mit einem  Satz in 
-Hohe von 40 %auf  die ersten 100.000 HFL Gewinn und einem Satz in Hohe 
von  35%  fiir  d'aruber  hinausgehende  Gewinne.  Diese  Satze  sind  dem 
marginalen _ Einkommensteuerspitzensatz  (  60 %)  . fur  Einkommen . tiber 
85.530 HFL  vergleichbar.  Damit  soli  eiri  zu  groBer  Unterschi~d zwischen  · 
dem - Steuersystem  fiir  Kapitafgesellschaften  und - dem  fiir  . andere 
Untemehrnensformen vermieden _  ~erden.  4 
4  lni Vereinigten  Konig reich  wurde  kOrzlich  ein  weiterer ermaBigter Satz  in  Hohe  ~on· 20.%  in  den 
_  Einkommensteuertarif eingefOhrt;  er gilt nur fOr  eine sehr niedrige Einkommensgruppe (die ersteri 
2._000 UKL, das sind rund. 1.500 ECU). Zu der dritten Uindergruppe schlieBiich gehfiren ltalien und Portugal; hier sind die 
Abstii.nde  zwischen  den  etTektiven  Korperschaft- und  Einkommensteuersatzen 
(  oberste Klasse) .so gering, daB sich ab einer bestimmten Gewinnhohe eine gewisse 
· SteuemeutraliHit  zwischen den  Rechtsformen  einstellt.  Deutschland  hat  kiirzlich 
sein · Steuersystem  in  diesem  Sinne  geandert,  urn  die  ungeschriebene  Regel  des . 
Quasiparallelismus  seiner  r  marginalen  Korperschaftsteuer- und 
Einkommensteuerspitzensatze einzUhalten. Seit dem 1. Januar 19g4 gilt ein von 36 
auf 30 % gesenkter Korperschaftsteuersatz fiir ausgeschiittete Gewinne und ein von 
50 auf 45 % gesenkter Steuersatz fiir einbel)altene Gewinne, so daB  die Differenz 
zwischen  letzterem  Satz  und  dem  marginalen  Spitzensatz · (53 %)  'der 
Einkommensteuer von  bisher 3 Punkte  auf 8 Punkte  gestiegen ware,  wenn  nicht 
beschlossen  worden  ware,  den  Einkommensteuersatz  fi.ir  Einkiinfte  aus 
Gew~rbebetrieb auf 47% zu  begrenzen, urn  eine gewisse GleichmaBigkeit in  der 
steuerlicheri  Bela5tung  der  korperschaftsteuerpflichtigen  und  der 
einkommensteuerpflichtigen Untemehmen zu erhalten. 
26 Comparative  table of rates  of corporation  tax  and  personal  income  tax:  all  levels of 
government(*) ( 1994) 
Rate of personal income  Differential\'  n  J 
Country  tax  pers.inc~  Rate of corporation tax 
tax/corp. tax 
Bottom  Top rate 
rate 
GERMANY  19  53 (47)( ..  *)  -2  30/45 (I)  . 
BELGIUM  26.75 [25]  59 [55]  -20  39% 
Reduced rates for SMEs(2): 
28% on profits between BFR 
0 and I million, 36% between 
1 and 3.6 million; 41% 
between 3.6 and 13  million 





SPAIN  20  56  -21  35 
FRANCE  5  56.8  ~23.47  33.33 
GREECE  5  40  -5  35 PJ 
IRELAND  27  48  -9  40% 
.. 
Reduced rate:  I 0% for 
manufacturing companies in 
certain areas (Shannon, IFSC) 
ITALY  10  51  +1.2  52.2 [36]  _t4J 
Ll]XEMBOURG  10 (+2.5%  50 (+2.5%)  -9.17  43.33 [33] PJ 




under LFR 0.4); progressive 
Fund) 
rates from 20 to 30% (LFR 0.4 
to 0.6 million); 30% (LFR 0.6 to 
I milliOJ1); 30-33% (LFR I to 
1.312 million); 33% (over 
LFR 1.312 million) 
NETHERLANDS  13  tOJ  60  -25  35% (but 40% for the first HFL 
1  00 000 in  pro (its) 
PORTUGAL·  15  40.  -0.4  39.6 [36] 
UNITED  25 ( l)  40  -7  33% 
KINGDOM  Reduced rate: 25% on profits  _ 
below UKL 300 000 
27 
. (*)  Rates shown in square brackets are  rates  of tax charged by  central  government. 
Effective rates include local taxation applied in certain Member States. 
(**)  The  differential  between  the  standard  rate  of .corporation  tax  applied  to 
undistributed pro tits and the top marginal rate of personal income tax. 
(***) Germany: from 1 January 1994, the rate of personal income tax on commercial or 
industrial  income  is  limited to  4 7%;  for other types of income,' .the  top marginal 
rate of 53% continues to apply. 
(1)  Germany: the rate of tax on distributed profits is 36%, that on undistributed profits 
50%. 
(2)  Belgium: this reduced rate of taxation applies to  incorporated SMEs that fulfil  all 
the following conditions: 
(a)  taxable income below BFR 13 million, 
(b)  no more than half their shares held by one or more other incorporated enterprises, 
(c)  investment value of  shares held no more than 50% of  paid-up capital; 
(d)  distributed profits not exceeding 13% of  paid-up capital. 
(3)  Greece:  for  private  limited  companies,  the  35%  rate  applies  to  the  net  residual 
· profits after deduction of the  remuneration of  the  three main shareholders taking 
part in the management of  the company. 
28 (4) ·  Italy: enterprises with no more. than three salaried employees in which the owner 
and  members of the  owner's. family  work  are  not  liable  to  pay  the  local  tax  on 
profits (ILOR). 
(5)  Luxembourg: companies pay an additional contribution of 1% to  the  Employm~nt 
Fund and a local profits tax at an average rate of 10%. 
(6)  Netherlands: a social security contribution of25.55% is added to the bottom rate of 
income tax, making the effective ·rate 38.55%. 
(7)  United Kingdom: a reduced rate of 20% was recently introduced intq the scale of 
personal income tax,  but only on a very narrow band (the first  UKL 2 000, about 
I 
ECU 1 500)  .. 
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..  ·  ..  :.•···  ·.  ,.,,·,,  •"• NOTE2 
Measures to alleviate the tax consequences of the conversion of sole proprietorships 
or partnerships into incorporated enterprises 
Whatever the attitudes adopted by Member States on a formal legal level (continuation or 
cessation of the business in question), most have introduced arrangements for alleviating 
the tax consequences ofsuch conversion operations. 
With regard to  the immediate taxation of profits, the great majority of Member States do 
not require early declaration of protits for the conversion of a sole proprietorship into a 
company  but  apply  the  normal  deadline  for  the  declaration  of income  (France  is  an 
exception  in  that  it  requires  a  return  to  be  submitted  within  60 days  of conversion: 
Greece also requires almost immediate payment). 
Similarly, the great majority of Member States authorize carry-over of provisions where 
the purpose of such provisions remains unchanged.  This kind of arrangement helps to 
ensure some degree oftax neutrality in the case of  changes of  legal structure. 
By contrast, the.b(!nefit of  a possible carry-over of losses is frequently lost on a change of 
legal  structure  because  the  activity  is  deemed  to  cease.  This  applies  particularly  to 
conversion into  a company;  however,  there are  arrangements  in  some  Member States 
(e.g. Germany, France, Ireland, Luxembourg and the  United Kingdom) for setting such 
losses  against  the  personal  income  of the  owner  (or  of the  partners  in  the  case  of a 
partnership). 
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With  regard  to  the  ·taxation  of  latent  capital  gains  on  the  conversion  of a  sole 
proprietorship into a company, the great majority of Member States permit the  business 
either todefer  taxation or to  be taxed at a preferential rate; . others permit enterprises to 
choose  between  immediate  and  deferred  taxation  (in  France latent capital  gains  on 
&preciable assets  are  automatically  taxed  on  conversion to  a  company,  although  the 
. owner may· choose between immediate and deferre<,i  taxation of la~ent capital ~ains on  · 
intangible assets).  In most Member States, these favourable arrangements are subject, in 
the case of a conversion operation carried out in  the  forn1  of transfers of-assets, to  the 
.  i 
transfers  being  remunerated  m~inly through  shares  which the  transferor undertakes  to 
.  .  . 
retain tor a minimum number of years and to'the assets being included in the new entity's 
accounts at their book value. 
It should be pointed out with regard to capital duties that the amount of duty payable on 
the  conversion of an enterprise  is  far  froin  negligible.  Transfer duties  are  frequently 
levied on transfers of buildings, property rights and goodwill for consideration.  The rates 
of these duties can be  very high, particularly  in  the  case of transfers  for  consideration · 
(this is the case, for example, where the company takes on the liabilities of  the tr~nsferor; 
. under  such  circumstances,  the  transfer  operation  is  noi:rrially  treated . as  a  sale). 
Directive 69/335/EEC  of  17 July 1969  (OJ No L 249 ·of 3 October 1969,  p. 25)  does 
permit  Member States  to  levy· transfer  duties  on  transfers  of immovable  assets  to 
incorporated enterprises at a rate in excess of the maximum harmonized capital-duty rate 
of 1% applicable to other types of  transfers: 
However, a number of Member States (e.g. Belgium, France and Spain) have adopted the 
principle which is  most frequently applied to  the taxation ofcapital gains in connection 
with a conversion operation:  taxation of  such gains may be suspended if the transferor is 
remunerated in the form· Of shares;  similarly; transfer duties.may be reduced substantially 
(application  o,f  a  flat-rate  amount  or  reduced  rate)  if,  for  example,  the  transfers  are 
remunerated  by  securities  which  the  transferor  undertakes  to  retain  for  a .  minimum 
period. 
31 . 
Tax treatment applied in the Member States when sole proprietorships.or partnerships are converted into incorporated enterprises 
Capital duties  Capital gains  Immediate taxation of  ·Carry-over of losses  Carry-over of provisions (*) 
profits 
Belgium  0,5% (I)  16,5% for tangible assets  no  no  .yes 
(transfer of  assets to an  33% for intangible assets (but 
incorporated enterprise in  temporary exemption if  the 
. exchange for shares)  business has not,specifically 
waived application of  the 
"continuation" arrangements) 
Denmark  1% rate  taxation suspended in the case  no  no  yes 
of  payment in the form of 
securities (equal to at least 
75% of transferred assets) and 
subject to the transferor 
retaining the securities 
----~----- -- --------
(I)  Temporary exemption from  capital duty  in  the case of transferts to  companies established· in  an  employment area,  to  headquarters of multinational companies establisehd  in 
Belgium. to companies undergoing conversion, to 'innovative companies and to companies located in a development area. 
( *)  This involves the possibility of carrying over provisions whose purpose remains unchanged. 
32 '  Capital duties  Capital gains  Immediate taxation of  '  Carry-over of losses  Carry-over of provisions (*) 
profits 
-
Germany  2% (Grunderwerbsteuer) on  suspension· of  taxation possible  no  no  yes 
transfers of land or buildings  (if  historic values.are entered  (but can be set against the· 
to a company  in the accounts of  the recipient  .  income of  the owner or 
company and if securities are  partners) 
retained by the transferor) 
Gr.:ece  normal rate of 1% but rate·  no taxation of  unrealized  yes  yes(?)  yes (except for certain types of 
varies between 3% and II%  capital gains (except for.  provision: e.g. provisions for 
..  for the transfer of  a. building  capital gains on property)  doubtful claims) 
f()r consideration (frt!quent 
occurence in the case of  sole 
proprietorships)  '  I 
Spain  normal rate of I% (corporate  taxation suspended (in the case  no  no  yes 
transactions) but 6% for the  of  transfers of  assets, etc.) 
transfer of  a building for  ' 
consideration 
\  . 
France.  fixed duty of  FF 500 where the  possible deferral of  taxation ·  yes (but the transferor is not  no (but for sole proprietors and  yes 
transferor retains for fivt! years  (capital gains on non- taxed on profits relating to  partners the trading deficit of 
the securities received in  depreciable assets) if securities  stocks if included at their book  the business transferred is 
return for the transfer (failing  received in payment for the  value in  the assets of  the  included in the total deficit . 
that, a special duty _of 8.6% for  transfer are retained. In the  recipient company)  that can be carried over for  -
transfers of  property and ,  case of  capital gains on  -five years for income-tax 
goodwill)  depreciable assets (tafxation  purposes) 
effected in the hands of  the 
recipient company), payment  -
of  tax is spread over five years  • 
33 Capital duties  Capital gains  Immediate taxation of  Carry-over of losses  Car.ry-over of provisions(*) 
profits 
Ireland  stamp duty of I%  taxation of  capital gains is  no  no (but carry-over possible as  yes 
suspended if remuneration is  part of  the overall deficit that 
in the form of securities  can be carried over for 
provided that the securities are  income-tax purposes) 
retained by the transferor 
I 
! 
Italy  transfers of immovable  taxation of capital gains  not available  not available  not available 
property to companies (8%)  suspended (if assets are carried 
in the balance sheet at their 
original value) 
Lux~mbourg  real or personal.estate  no taxation of  capital gains if.  no  no (but deductibility is  yes 
invested:  I%  th_e assets are carried at their  permined in the hands of the 
in the case of assets transferred  ' book value in the accounts of  person who has incurred the 
for consideration: from 0.24%  the recipient company  loss, even if he is no longer the 
to 6% depending on the nature  owner; the same applies to 
of  the assets  partners in a partnership) 
--
34 .Capital duties  Capital gains  Immediate taxation of  Carry-over of losses  Carry-over of provisions 
·profits 
Netherlands  not available  not available  not available  not available  n.d. 
I 
,Portugal  duty ("sisa" municipal tax) on  - taxation of  capital gains  no (I) .  no (I)  no (I) 
transfers of  immovable  (st9cks and assets) (I) 
I 
property:  - no taxation (tax neutrality) 
4% to 10% depending on the  (2)  ~-- (2)  yes (2)  yes (2) 
nature and use of  the property  .. 
United  stamp duty of I% (land,  taxation of  companies in  no  yes (on future dividends)  yes 
Kingdom  buildings, etc.)  principle but relief is available 
(in the case of  payment in the 
form of  shares) 
(I)  tax .arrangements applied to the conversion of  a sole proprietorship into a company 
(2)  tax treatment applied to the conversion of  a partnership into a company 
35 NOTE 3 
Comparative-figures on the size of the corporate sector 
(The figures in  Number  Population  Number of  Total taxes as  Corporate 
this table are  of  compa- ('OOOs)  companies  % ofGDP  income tax 
based on 1989  nies  per 1000  as% of 
data)  head of  GOP 
population 
Belgium  225,640  9~938  22.70  44.3  3.10 
Denmark  85,917  5,132  16.74  49.9  2.00 
Germany  404,195  62,063  6.50  38.1  1.91 
Greece  70,824  10,033  7.05  33.2.  1.33 
Spain  655,491  38,888  16.86  34.4  2.06 
France  699,170  56,423  12.39  43.8  2.19 
Ireland  110,418  3,515  31.41  37.6  1.50 
Italy  300,000  57,540  5.21  37.8  3.40 
Luxemburg  ll  ,941  377  31.67  A2.4  7.21 
Netherlands  257;000  14,846  17.31  46.0  3.68 
-· 
Portugal  171,919  9,793.  17.55  35.1· .  . . 
n.a.  , 
uriited  1,005,300  57,236  17.56  36.5  4.02 
Kingdom 
Total  3,997,815  325,785 
Average  12.27  39.9  2.95 
36 NOTE  4 
Description of the "business rules"- Denmark 
.  .  ·'  .  ' 
1.  Natural persons carrying on business independently (as so!e proprietors or partners) 
can opt for the "business rules". 
2.  The objective of  these rules is as follows: 
(I)  to  ~ender the business's interest payments fully tax-deductible (as is the case with its:  ; 
other operational expenditure); 
(2)  to ensure that that part of the business's profits constituting a return on its equity is 
taxed in the same way as other capital gains;  .· 
(3)  to counterbalance cyclical trends;  · 
-
(  4)  to offer taxation at 34%, the same rate as corporation tax. 
3:1.  The  rules  require  independent  businessmen  to  keep  their  business  and  personal 
finances  separate for  accounting purposes;  distinct accounts must be kept  for  the 
businesses income and personal finances. 
The business income is assessed in accordance with the general rules laid down in 
the ta.X legislation. 
~ .  t· 
If,  in  a  particular income  ·y~;-, a  b~~i~~ss ~ho;s:  a proflt,-:this  is  divided into. an 
imputed capital gain (Le. the return on the business's own capital) and the remaining 
profit.·  Capital gains  are  assessed  as  income  from  capital,  like  other  return  on  ·. 
capital.  The  remainder of the  profit is  assessed as personal  income on a sliding 
scale.  However,  the  profit  is  only  liable  to  tax when  it  is  withdrawn  from  the 
business. 
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l, Nevertheless, the taxable person may refrain from  withdrawing the profit, or a pan 
thereof, and opt to  retain  it in the business.  In that case it attracts advance tax of 
34% (i.e.  at the same rate  as  corporation tax).  It  is  only when the taxable person 
withdraws  the  accumulated  profit  in  a subsequent year  that  it  is  finally  taxed  as 
personal  income.  The advance business tax  is  set off against the  taxable person's 
and his/her· spouse's tax  for  the year in  question and the five  succeeding years  but 
cannot be disbursed as a cash payment. 
If the business shows a loss in an income year, the loss must first be set off against 
any  accumulated  profit.  In  the  absence  of any  accumulated  profit,  the  loss  is 
deducted  from  the  taxpayer's  other income.  Any  remaining  loss  may  be  carried 
forward  for  deduction  against  the  business's  profits  and  other  iricome  in  the . 
succeeding five years. 
3.2.  As a general rule, there are no restrictions on the nature of businesses which can opt 
for  the  business rules.  Nevertheless,  if the  business  reflects  aspects of a  private 
limited company, the option is not available.  Income from such companies is taxed 
as  income  from  capital.  ·Insolvent  businesses  are  likewise  excluded  from  the 
business rules. 
3.3.  If the taxable person operates a number of businesses, they must all  be subject to the 
business rules.  Under these rules, all such businesses are treated as one business. 
·'If the taxable person is  married and  his/her spouse operates his/her own business, 
.  the spouse must apply either the business rules or.the "capital gains rules" to his/her 
business. 
3.4.  The taxable person is  free  to  determine each year whether the business is to· come 
tinder the business rules. 
If the taxable person ceases to  apply. the  business rules  without transferring the 
business, any accumulated profit is  taxed  as  personal  income  in ·the  income year 
. following the ,income year in which he last applied the business rules. 
38 If the  taxable person  ceases trading  in  respect of one of a number of businesses 
without transferring the business, any retained profits are taxed proportionately. 
· A  taxable  person  who  has  previously  applied  the  business  rules  inl respect  of a 
.  .  .  .  . 
business and. who,  within  th~ immediately succeeding five  income years, resumes 
application Of the rules must, when calculating the business's capital account, assess  · 
real property at the value which  was indicated when .the rules were last applied ..  · 
3.5.  If the  taxable  person  transfers  the  business  ~r ceast;s  trading  as  an  ind~pendent 
·business, any accumulated profits are taxed as unearned income in the-same income 
year  ·or,  if the  distinction  between  the  business. accounts  and  the  taxpayer's 
indivi~ualaccounts are maintained for the rest of the year, the  suc~eeding income 
year.  If the  taxable  person  acquires  another  business  before  the  end :of the 
succee9ing income year,  he  may  apply  the  business  rules  uninterrupted,  provided 
_  that  the  distinction_ between the  business  accounts and  his  personal  accounts  is 
maintained throughout the entire period. 
.  - . 
If the  taxable person  applies the  business rules without .int~rruption, the purchase 
.  .  . 
price received .on the transfer of  the business is subject to the business rules. 
Where one of  a number of businesses, a business which has been separated from an 
existing  business~  ·o_r a  n~tion~l part of a business .  is transferred, the  pur~hase price 
· received is subject to the busine.ss rules.  The taxable person may optto transfer an 
.  amount not. exceeding the  net cash consideration outside the  business rules to  his 
.  . 
individual finances, provided that a corresponding part of  any accumulated· profits is 
. withdrawn and taxed_as personal income in the same income year. 
39 3.6.  If a taxable  person ceases to  be  liable to  tax  in  Denmark or in  any  other respect 
acquires a tax domicile abroad, any accumulated profit is taxed as personal income 
in the income year in which he ceases. to he liahlc to tax or changes his tax domicile. 
3.  7.  Businesses subject to the business rules may be transferred and/or transformed in the 
same way as other businesses.  If the business is  transferred and deferred taxation 
applies. taxation of  any accumulated profits may also be deferred  . 
•  0 
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